interests of his employer at all times. The employee shall not follow a course of action that harms or places at risk the interests of the employer. ' 13 Expressed in such broad terms the obligation appears to be highly continuous to a fiduciary obligation; the obligation to ` to act in the best interests of his employer at all times' is particularly significant in this regard. However, it is not the case that the obligation of fidelity goes this far: ` the hallmark of a fiduciary duty is a requirement that a person pursues the interests of another at the expense of his own: but an employment relationship does not in itself require an employee to pursue his employer's interests at the expense of his own.' 14 Whilst the employee must further the employer's interests he need not do so exclusively and, for instance, is entitled to take limited steps by way of preparation (prior to his leaving the employment) to compete with the employer without falling foul of the obligation of fidelity.
Where Next?
There does appear to be some evidence that the obligations arising under the employment contract are moving closer to those owed by a fiduciary; the implied obligation of fidelity, for instance, may demand more by way of propriety where a senior employee is concerned. 15 More fundamentally, but perhaps questionably, some jurisdictions now hold that senior managers are fiduciaries. The way in which an employee's obligation of disclosure has evolved is also of relevance. An employee is not obliged to disclose his own misconduct whether that misconduct arises before the commencement of the employment relationship or during its existence; Bell v Lever Bros remains good law 16 . submitted that the stance adopted in the Sybron case is well-founded. Such obligations may well be inherent in the role undertaken by the employee and hence essential to proper job performance. The circumstances relevant to determining whether a duty to report is owed will include the express contractual obligations of the employee and his role in the organisation
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. It is also the case that the creation of the implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence may mean be that, in future, an obligation of disclosure will apply where one side possesses information that the other could not reasonably be expected to know and where the information would serve to protect the interests of the other side. 20 In any event, it is arguable that the emergence of a more extensive obligation of disclosure moves the employment contract a step closer to joining the ranks of fiduciary relationships.
Obligations Owed by Senior Management
As we have seen, it appears that those belonging to `senior management' are now viewed as fiduciaries in some jurisdictions and therefore constitute an exception to the general rule. Admittedly, there is no reason in principle why the common law obligations owed by employees should be the same irrespective of the role played by them or their place in the organisational hierarchy. Why should the obligations imposed by law as a consequence of entry into a contract of employment be the same in respect of both a member of the senior management team and a junior salesperson? Certainly in Gray Encompassing senior management officials within the class of those owing fiduciary obligations was `simply recognition of the degree of control which their positions give them in corporate operations, a control which rises above day-to-day accountability to owning shareholders and which comes under some scrutiny only at annual general or at special meetings.' The court appears to have been concerned that some senior employees had as much opportunity to influence the company's affairs as directors.
Were they to abuse their powers then the risk posed to the company is of a similar magnitude. This rationale might be thought to mirror that which prompted the emergence of the concept of de facto directors. 25 This concept allows persons who can be regarded as having an involvement in the corporate governance of a company (but who have not been appointed as directors) to `be treated as directors for the purposes of statutory provisions relating to such matters as wrongful trading by, and disqualification of, directors'. 26 Guidance on the criteria to be used in identifying such a director was given by Jacob J in Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Tjolle: `Those factors include at least whether or not there was a holding out by the company of the individual as a director, whether the individual used the title, whether the individual had proper information (e.g. management accounts) on which to base decisions, and whether the individual has to make major decisions and so on. Taking all these factors into account, one asks 'was this individual part of the corporate governing structure?' answering it as a kind of jury question.' 27 As a corollary of their participation in decisions going to the heart of the company's welfare de facto directors owe fiduciary duties. Some senior managers will undoubtedly be de facto directors. Whatever the merits of the decision in O'Malley, the manner in which the law in Canada has evolved since then flags up several concerns and two points might be made in particular. First, it has proved very difficult to find a convincing basis upon which to distinguish between those who are senior managers and those who are not. Second, and not unrelated to the previous point, the range of employees who have been caught has been extensive. Deciding who can be categorised as a member of senior management has not proved to be at all straightforward. A voluminous body of case law has led to little progress in respect of either indicia or definition. On occasion judicial focus has been on the nature of the discretion possessed by the employee; employees being classified as fiduciaries where they `are in the position to unilaterally exercise their authority in a way that could affect their employer's legal and economic interests'
28 . This is less than helpful given that the range of employees who possess a degree of discretion is extensive; in a different context Lord Steyn noted that `there can be discretion even in the hammering of a nail'. 29 It might be said that any employee with any measure of discretion is in a position to impact upon the employer's interests; albeit that the likelihood of significant damage occurring will vary enormously. Some other Canadian decisions look to the degree of trust imposed as a guide to the position of the employee in the management hierarchy: `In general, the relationship becomes elevated to the fiduciary level when the employer reposes trust and confidence in the employee on a continual basis, relying upon the employee in reaching business decisions. It is the trust and reliance transferred by the employer which gives the employee the power, and in some cases, the discretion, to make business decisions, on the employer's behalf.' 30 Again though, particularly in a large organisation, a significant number of employees may be in this position and, in fact, the category of employees concerned has not been limited to those involved in formulating overall strategy.
In Anderson v Smyth and Kelly Customs Brokers v World Wide Customs Brokers,
for example, a manager responsible for the day-to-day operations of a company's regional office was found to be a fiduciary as he was in `a position of trust with attendant power to affect the economic interests of the appellant.' 31 The nature and significance of the decisions that the employee is entrusted to take must also be highly relevant if this factor is to serve as a test. 32 Is it only business decisions that might be expected to be taken by members of senior management that are determinative? If the answer to that question is yes then we are no further forward in our search for elucidation. Finding a means to determine the class of employees who are caught by the O'Malley doctrine has been hugely problematic. The underlying rationale has been lost sight of; courts do not ask whether the employee is in a position to control the business to a degree that is analogous to directors. The extensive case law has failed to produce effective criteria. Lack of clarity about what is meant by the term senior management has led to classification as a fiduciary being extended to employees who are not involved in corporate decision-making but whose role is simply important to the success of the company. On occasion in Canada it has sufficed that the employee could be viewed as `key personnel'; though the case law on who is key is difficult to reconcile. 33 The range of employees who are encompassed is though considerable. More significantly, the identification of the category of `key personnel' has served as a catalyst for the revision, and readjustment in favour of the employer, of existing obligations. In Radd Precision v Lall a sales manager, who had exclusive contact with customers and had access to the employer's confidential information about the customers, was viewed as a fiduciary. 34 It is clear that the defendant was not a decision-maker in the employer's organisation. The key to the decision seems to have been the fact that he had complete access to the customer list. 35 Of course the employee who has access to confidential information already undertakes obligations by virtue of his duty of fidelity. Radd suggests a perceived need to reconstitute the latter obligation on a more onerous basis. Adams J, in CHS Air Conditioning v Environmental Air Systems, pointed to one factor which he thought prompted courts to find that an employee stood in a fiduciary relationship with their employer: "where former employees exploit obviously and highly confidential information in a manner that strikes a court as grossly unfair, it is more likely that a fiduciary obligation will be found to exist or that the information will be treated as the equivalent to a trade secret."
36
Such an expansive approach to fiduciary obligations may be seen as unsatisfactory on policy grounds: `…the general interest of the public in free competition and the consideration that in general citizens should be free to pursue new opportunities, in my opinion, requires courts to exercise caution in imposing restrictive duties on former employees in less than clear circumstances. Generally speaking…the law favours the granting of freedom to individuals to pursue economic advantage through mobility in employment.
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The employer's interests can be protected by the obtaining of a covenant and the employee's by judicial scrutiny thereof.
33 See the various authorities listed in Boehmers, (n 24). 34 1996 CanLII 8173 (the proceedings were interlocutory). 35 Other cases of this sort are referred to in Boehmers (n 24). what matters is control of company strategy and policy. They are specifically formulated to determine whether the individual concerned is part of "the corporate governing structure". 40 It must also be said that if the law on de facto directors succeeds in capturing such individuals it is not clear whether there is any justification for senior managers being held to owe fiduciary duties as well.
The Future
As we have seen, there are some indications that the contract of employment is taking on more of a Tjolle (n 27).
fiduciary flavour. However, I am far from convinced that they are particularly weighty. The most significant development has been the decision in O'Malley but the inclusion of senior management can be seen as an exception to the general rule; albeit one of uncertain ambit. Moreover, O'Malley may not represent the law of Scotland. The case law developments on disclosure are consistent with, and can be explained by, the contract of employment being influenced by notions of good faith to a greater extent than was previously the case. Indeed it is important to have regard to the key development and driver for change; i.e. the emergence of the implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence -a term which has become central to the content and values of the employment contract. One impact of the term may be that employees will be entitled to concern themselves less with the interests of the employer. This is however contingent upon the manner in which the courts resolve the tension between the mutual trust term and the obligation of fidelity. It should be said that the former term emerged from contemporary judicial thinking about the employment relationship whilst the latter is much longer established. The former term reflects `a `unitary' view of industrial relations in which common interest and partnership (and not conflict and subordination) are emphasised as features of the employment relationship.'
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The way in which the resulting tension is resolved will have significant consequences for the extent of an employee's obligations. In the Malik case Lord Steyn observed that `the implied obligation as formulated is apt to cover the great diversity of situations in which a balance has to be struck between an employer's interest in managing his business as he sees fit and the employee's interest in not being unfairly and improperly exploited.' 42 The advent of the obligation of mutual trust and confidence means that the employment contract will have to be interpreted in a manner which takes account of the fact that the interests of employer and employee may legitimately diverge. The obligation requires that `each party must have regard to the interests of the other, but not that either must subjugate his interests to those of the other. ' 43 The requirement that regard be had to the interests of both sides may appear difficult to reconcile with the conventional formulation of the obligation of fidelity which requires that the employee does not act contrary to the employer's interests. Having said that the articulation of the detailed requirements imposed under the umbrella of the obligation of fidelity also involves a balancing exercise (albeit implicitly) between the interests of the two sides. The case law on the legitimacy of preparatory acts of competition, prior to leaving employment, furnishes an example. I would suggest that the emergence of the obligation of mutual trust and confidence, given its explicit recognition of the employee's interests, may require that the balance be struck somewhat differently in the future. This would allow for proper account to be taken of the employee's interests. Some of the older cases dealing with the obligation of fidelity may have been based on the erroneous view that the employment contract is fiduciary in nature requiring `that one party must exercise his powers for the benefit of another.' 44 The courts must determine how the implied obligations of mutual trust and confidence and fidelity should be read together;
there is an obvious need for internal coherence within the body of law constituted by the implied terms of the contract of employment.
Over vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power. 48 Vulnerability of this nature will often be present in a fiduciary relationship but viewing the employer as being at the mercy of the employee seems counterintuitive. Can it really be said that the employer is vulnerable? It is certainly the case that should the employee perform his obligations incompetently there is a risk to the employer's business. In that sense, as in all contracts, each party has a degree of vulnerability. However, the employer could hardly be said to be `peculiarly' vulnerable. Moreover, he has a number of devices at his disposal, such as imposing a restrictive covenant, which can be utilised to protect his interests. Recognition of the employee's vulnerability in the face of disparity in bargaining power prompts the question whether the employer should be held to owe fiduciary obligations to the employee. The answer is in fact no. Lord
Steyn's treatment of divergent interests works both ways. Just as it serves to protect the employee from the unitary perspective which informed the obligation of fidelity it also allows the employer to have regard to interests other than those of the employee.
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Douglas Brodie, University of Stirling.
This article evolved from a paper presented at an Edinburgh Centre for Private Law workshop in December 2010. I would like to thank all those present for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer.
48 Frame ( n 45) at para 60. In the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Alberta v Elder Advocates 2011 SCC 24 at para 36 it was said that `for an ad hoc fiduciary duty to arise, the claimant must show, in addition to the vulnerability arising from the relationship as described by Wilson J. in Frame: (1) an undertaking by the alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests of the alleged beneficiary or beneficiaries; (2) a defined person or class of persons vulnerable to a fiduciary's control (the beneficiary or beneficiaries); and (3) a legal or substantial practical interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries that stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary's exercise of discretion or control.'
